基础设施特许经营中承诺与再谈判研究综述  

Government Commitment Incredibility and Renegotiation in Infrastructure Concession:a Literature Review

作　　者：陈富良[1] 刘红艳[2] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学经济学院 [2]江西财经大学产业经济研究院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2015年第1期88-96,共9页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"基础设施产业特许经营合约中的政府承诺及其治理研究"(13AJL011)

摘　　要：在基础设施产业特许经营中,由于政府承诺能力的缺失,存在着大量失败的案例。已有文献分析了政府承诺能力缺失的原因,主要分为政府主观性的动机和特许权本身的客观性问题。承诺能力的缺失对投资产生了负激励。针对政府承诺能力缺失的救济方式,可分为一般救济和再谈判救济。但再谈判可能损害消费者的利益。因而,设计合理的可用的再谈判机制,制定规范的再谈判程序,是基础设施产业特许经营合约再谈判研究的可扩展方向。There are many failures due to the government commitment incredibility in infrastructure concession. Former literature gives the reasons of the government commitment incredibility,including the officials promotion and the sense of concession,while the government incredibility is negative to investment.The government incredibility also include general remedies and renegotiation remedies,and the latter may harm consumers’benefits.Therefore,the study may go further towands designing reasonable renegotiation mechanism and renegotiation procedure.

关 键 词：特许经营合约 政府承诺 再谈判 

分 类 号：F294[经济管理—国民经济] F284