多单位物品拍卖中合谋问题的实验研究——以虚拟排放权为拍卖标的物  

Collusion in Homogenous Multi-Unit Auction:An Experimental Analysis—The Virtual Emissions for the Auction Object

作　　者：唐邵玲[1] 阳晓华[1] 汪鹏程[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学数学与计算机科学学院,中国长沙410081

出　　处：《湖南师范大学自然科学学报》2014年第3期74-79,共6页Journal of Natural Science of Hunan Normal University

基　　金：湖南省科技计划资助项目(2012FJ4098)

摘　　要：考虑"显性"与"隐性"两种合谋环境,分别对歧视价格拍卖、统一价格拍卖以及向上叫价时钟拍卖机制进行模拟实验.研究结果表明:隐性合谋环境下,统一价格拍卖机制对拍卖方有利,向上叫价时钟拍卖对竞买人有利;显性合谋环境下,歧视价格拍卖优于统一价格拍卖;合谋环境对歧视价格拍卖机制无显著影响,但统一价格拍卖更易促使显性合谋行为的发生.提高保留价、控制信息的披露以及设置干扰卡特尔成员执行协议的法律障碍是有效防范合谋的3项策略.Considering both the explicit collusion and the tacit collusion,the simulative laboratory experiments on Pay-as-Bid Auction and Uniform-Price Auction as well as Ascending Clock Auction were conducted.The results indicate that in the case of explicit collusion,the Uniform-Price Auction benefits auctioneers,meanwhile,Ascending Clock Auction benefits bidders.In the case of tacit collusion,Pay-as-Bid Auction is advantageous to Uniform-PriceAuction.Collusion has no distinct effect on Pay-as-Bid Auction,and however,tacit collusion tends to happen under the condition of Uniform-Price Auction.There are three strategies which can effectively prevent the occurrence of collusion：raising reserved price,controlling the reveal of information and setting-up the law of disturbing Cartel alliance agreement.

关 键 词：多单位物品拍卖 隐性合谋 显性合谋 排放权 实验 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]