基于管理防御假说下经理人投资行为的博弈研究  

Game Researching of the Investment Behavior of Managers Under the Hypothesis of Managerial Entrenchment

作　　者：李秉祥[1] 王梦泽[1] 姚冰湜[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054

出　　处：《软科学》2015年第1期135-138,144,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272118);陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902)

摘　　要：应用博弈方法分析影响投资行为的具体因素以及影响经理人对长短期投资选择的因素;运用完全信息博弈和不完全信息博弈两种模型阐述经理人对投资行为的选择;分析补贴力度的大小和范围。结果表明:适度的补贴能使经理人放弃短期投资而选择对股东有利的长期投资。This paper application of game theory to analysis the influence factors of managers ＇investment decisions , discuss the factors that influencing managers choose the long-term investment or short-term investments , using complete information game and incomplete information game two elaborate on the manager＇s choice of investment behavior and using the method of game analysis of subsidies＇size and scope .The results show that moderate subsidies can make managers give up short-term investment and choose the better long-term investment for shareholders.

关 键 词：管理防御 投资短视 完全信息动态博弈 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]