合作抑或惩罚:WTO可得事实规则的本原追问——基于反补贴调查的视角  

Cooperation or Punishment: Primitive Inquiry into Rules of Facts Available in WTO from Perspective of Countervailing Investigation

作　　者：李仲平[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院法律系

出　　处：《国际贸易问题》2015年第1期101-111,共11页Journal of International Trade

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目(12BFX139);上海财经大学研究生创新基金资助项目(CXJJ-2012-307)

摘　　要：WTO可得事实规则是以民事诉讼缺席审判制度为法理构建的一项中性调查工具,其本身蕴含的促进合作的价值取向,不仅强调应以自然正义的法律理念和《反倾销协议》附件2作为制约反补贴调查机关自由裁量权的正当性基础和具体依据,还暗示了被调查方在反补贴调查中遵循善意原则所应承担的责任,并以此力图实现反补贴调查机关和被调查方之间权利与义务关系的平衡。The rule of facts available in WTO is a neutral survey instrument based on the judgment by default system of civil action which contains the value guidance of enhancing cooperation. It not only emphasizes the conception of natural justice and the second annex of WTO Anti-dumping Agreement as the le- gitimacy and specific basis to restrict the discretionary power of the countervailing investigation organ, but also implies that the investigated party should abide by the principle of good faith in order to achieve the balance of rights and obligations between the countervailing investigation organ and the investigated party.

关 键 词：可得事实规则 反补贴 合作 善意原则 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]