面向制造成本甄别和销售努力激励的供应链协调契约研究  

Supply chain coordination contract with manufacturing cost screening and sales effort incentives

作　　者：黄梅萍[1,2] 汪贤裕[2] 张欢[2] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学土木工程学院,福州350116 [2]四川大学商学院,成都610064

出　　处：《运筹学学报》2014年第4期45-57,共13页Operations Research Transactions

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.71071103);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(Nos.13YJC630053;14YJC630020);福州大学科研启动基金(No.XRC-1267)

摘　　要：针对二级供应链中制造商隐藏成本信息和销售商隐藏努力行动引发的低效率问题,结合委托代理理论,引入一个虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,建立逆向选择和道德风险下供应链协调模型,来甄别制造商的真实成本且对销售商的努力实施有效激励,并通过模型求解得到供应链实现协调时各契约参数需满足的关系.结果表明,所设计的协调契约能够激励制造商自愿真实上报成本信息,刺激销售商寻求低成本的制造商进行合作并付出最优努力.最后,通过算例分析验证了契约模型对供应链协调的有效性.To solve the low efficiency caused by hiding of the manufacturer＇s cost and retailer＇s efforts in a two-echelon supply chain, a virtual-third party was introduced as a selfless principal based on principal agent theory. Firstly, a supply chain coordination model under adverse selection and moral hazard was developed to screen the manufac- turer＇s true cost and make retailer work hard. Secondly, the relationship among the coordination contract parameters was obtained. Finally, main results revealed that the coordination contract could incent the manufacturer to tell the truth, and the retailer co- operated with the low-cost manufacturers to carry out the optimal efforts. Furthermore, a numerical example was used to verify the conclusions.

关 键 词：逆向选择 道德风险 供应链协调 虚拟第三方 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]