会计稳健性、贷款抵押与银企所有权模式  

Accounting Conservatism,Loan Collateral and Borrower/Lender State Ownership

作　　者：王艳艳[1] 于李胜[1] 王晓珂[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院/两岸关系和平发展协同创新中心,361005

出　　处：《会计研究》2014年第12期11-17,95,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71002043;71372074;71422008);教育部新世纪优秀人才(NCET-11-0297);福建省新世纪优秀人才(于李胜);霍英东青年教师基金(131083);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2013221014和2012221010)资助

摘　　要：会计稳健性和抵押是缓解债务契约中代理问题的替代机制,本文探讨了银行和企业的国有属性对二者替代关系的影响。研究表明,银行与企业的国有权属性减弱了债务契约中抵押条款与会计稳健性之间的替代关系,即抵押品与会计稳健性在缓解债务契约中代理问题方面的替代效应在国有企业中相对较弱,二者的替代效应会随企业向国有银行贷款比重的增加而减弱。这一结果给我们的启示是,非国有企业在向银行贷款时,可以通过提高财务报表的稳健性来降低银行对其抵押品的要求。We examine the effect of borrower and lender state ownership on the substantive relation between accounting conservatism and loan collateral for a sample of Chinese firms during 2001 to 2006. We document that the substitutive relation is attenuated by borrower and lender state ownership. These results are consistent with our hypotheses that the marginal benefit of accounting conservatism,as reflected in reduced collateral requirements,is less pronounced for state- owned enterprises and for firms that obtain more loans from state- owned banks.

关 键 词：会计稳健性 贷款抵押 国有银行 国有企业 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F275F224