基于策略型顾客的损失厌恶型供应链协调  

Loss-Averse Supply Chain Coordination Based on Strategic Customers

作　　者：张青青[1] 韩金仓[1] 

机构地区：[1]兰州商学院,甘肃兰州10741

出　　处：《沈阳大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第6期501-509,共9页Journal of Shenyang University：Natural Science

摘　　要：考虑由一个供应商、一个销售商和一群策略型顾客组成的供应链.采用理性预期平衡假设,研究策略型顾客的风险偏好对集中型供应链和分散型供应链决策者的策略影响;应用前景理论建立供应链的目标函数,比较分析批发价契约在损失厌恶情况下与风险中性情况下协调供应链的差异,并通过算例进行数值验证.结果表明:供应链的订货量和产品价格会随着策略型顾客风险偏好的增加而降低;当集中型供应链的损失厌恶偏好系数大于销售商的损失厌恶偏好系数时,此时批发价契约可以协调供应链.批发价契约作为现实中最常用的契约,所得的结论为供应链管理提供了很好的理论依据以及实践指导.Considering a supply chain with a supplier,a retailer and some strategic customers.Adopting rational expectations equilibrium hypothesis,the influence of strategic customers＇risk preference on the centralized supply chain is studied and supply chain＇s decision makings are decentralized;the prospect theory is taken to build target functions of the supply chain,the differences of the wholesale price contracts are compared and analyzed to coordinate the supply chain in the case of loss-averse and risk-neutral situation,and verified by the numerical examples.The research results show that supply chain quantity and product price will decrease with the increasing of customer risk preference;when the risk preference coefficient of centralized supply chain is greater than the retailer＇s,the supply chain achieve coordination.Wholesale price contract as a commonly used contract in the reality,the conclusion provides a good theoretical basis and practical guidance for supply chain management.

关 键 词：损失厌恶 前景理论 策略型顾客 理性预期平衡 批发价契约 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]