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机构地区:[1]天津大学管理与经济学部公共资源管理研究中心 [2]天津大学
出 处:《城市问题》2015年第1期27-32,40,共7页Urban Problems
基 金:2011年度天津市教委社会科学重大项目(2011ZD009)
摘 要:采用2004-2012年全国235个地级市政府的非平衡面板数据,在微观层面上分析了地方政府官员的晋升竞争、个人特征对城市扩张的影响。研究发现,地方政府官员的晋升竞争可以显著促进城市扩张;地方政府官员的任期、年龄均与城市扩张之间呈现显著负相关关系;相对于外地晋升的政府官员,本地晋升的政府官员推进城市扩张的积极性更高,而由上级政府部门下派的官员推进城市扩张的积极性较低;官员晋升竞争对城市扩张的影响因地理条件而异。Using an unbalanced database of 235 prefec- ture - level cities of China from 2004 to 2012, this essay analyses the impacts of promotion competition, personal characteris- tics of local government officials on urban expansion. As the results show, promotion competition of local government officials is significantly beneficial for urban expansion, while age and tenure of officials are negatively related to urban expansion; compared with officials promoted from other places, officials that promoted locally are more likely to boost urban expansion, while officials that designated by superior government are less active in boosting urban expansion; geography conditions the relationship between promotion competition and urban expansion.
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