“合作社主导型农产品供应链”利益分配研究  

Research on Profit Allocation in Cooperative-led Agricultural Products Supply Chain

作　　者：高强[1] 穆丽娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学管理学院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《西部论坛》2015年第1期8-15,共8页West Forum

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273248)

摘　　要：基于"农业合作社+加工企业+零售商"的农产品供应链模式,运用Stackelberg博弈分析和Shapley值法以及修正后的Shapley值法研究"合作社主导型农产品供应链"联盟中各主体的利益分配,并引入模拟数值进行实证分析,结果表明:修正后的Shapley值分配方法使农业合作社得到了高于基础收益的分配额,而加工企业和零售商所得利益则比修正之前少;这种联盟关系体现了按贡献分配利益的原则,更符合实际,且仍然是稳定的。因此,可以通过修正后的Shapley值法设计合理的利益共享契约,以维持农产品供应链联盟关系的稳定性。Based on the agricultural products supply chain pattern of ＂agricultural cooperatives ＋ processors ＋retailers＂,the paper proposes the concept of ＂cooperative-led agricultural supply chain＂for the first time. By the Stackelberg game theory,Shapley value and modified Shapley value,the paper analyzes the profit allocation for each subject in the alliance. Furthermore,the paper introduces empirical values and proposes reasonable profit allocation of each subject in the alliance. The results show that by modified Shapley value method the agricultural cooperative gets more profit than the basic profit allocation,while the processor and retailer get less profit,but the relationship among the alliance is still stable because the principal of allocation depending on contribution is applied. Based on the analysis above,reasonable profit-sharing contract can be designed by modified Shapley value to maintain stable agricultural products supply chain alliance.

关 键 词：农产品供应链 供应链联盟 农业合作社 利益分配 按贡献分配 修正后的Shapley值 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F321.42[经济管理—产业经济] F224