电子商务环境下耐用品制造商和零售商策略的博弈  

A Game Theory Analysis of Competitive Strategies of Durable Goods Manufacturer and Dealer under the Electronic Commerce Environment

作　　者：彭静[1,2,3] 林杰[1] 林正 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济管理学院,上海200092 [2]浙江农林大学信息工程学院,浙江临安311300 [3]浙江省林业智能监测与信息技术研究重点实验室,浙江临安311300 [4]浙江省特种设备检验研究院,浙江杭州310020

出　　处：《工业工程》2014年第6期89-94,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71071114);教育部人文社科研究规划项目(11YJC630216);广东省自然科学基金项目(S2012010010794)

摘　　要：构造了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两周期双渠道耐用品销售模型,制造商同时通过零售商和自有电子直销渠道销售产品。通过求解每个周期优化问题的Kuhn-Tucker条件,得到供应链成员每个周期的最优策略和利润。通过与单一渠道比较分析,发现产品的耐用性和电子直销渠道的成本影响着双方的最优策略,当制造商电子渠道的销售成本高于一定门槛时,制造商开通电子渠道,但不接收订单获利会更多。通过分析还发现当制造商电子渠道的销售成本较高时,制造商开通电子直销渠道,零售商将获利。A two-period dual channel model is considered in which a manufacturer sells a durable product directly through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent dealer who sells products direct- ly to consumers. By solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the optimization problem of each period, each supply chain player＇s optimal decisions and profits are obtained. The results show that the product dura- bility and direct selling cost have an important impact on player＇ s optimal strategies in a dual channel supply chain. When the direct selling cost exceeds a certain threshold, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an e-channel even when there are no products sales through it. Moreover, the dealer may benefit from the manufacturer＇ s encroachment when the direct selling cost is higher.

关 键 词：耐用品 竞争策略 博弈 双渠道 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]