政府主导下军民融合式协同创新的演化博弈  

An Analysis of Collaborative Innovation of Civil-Military Integration under the Guide of the Government Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：赵黎明[1] 刘嘉玥 陈喆芝[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《工业工程》2014年第6期121-126,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

摘　　要：应用演化博弈理论,从动态角度对有限理性的政府、军工企业和民营企业间的博弈行为进行分析,探讨政府主导下军民合作创新系统中双方成员的演化稳定策略,提出促进军工领域多主体最优合作的对策和建议。结果表明,协同创新系统的超额收益、研发总成本以及背叛收益等因素对双方的策略选择具有直接的影响。政府通过建立完善的激励、监督和惩罚机制,打造良好的军民融合式发展环境,发挥宏观调控作用,能够促进创新体系向帕累托最优的方向演化。The evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze the game behavior of limited rational govern- ment, military industrial enterprises and private enterprises from the dynamic angle, and the evolutionary stable strategy of both agents in the cooperation innovation system under the guide of the government is discussed, then optimal cooperation measures and suggestions are put forward. The results show that the excess returns, total cost, betrayal income and other factors have a direct influence on the strategy selection in the cooperation process. The government should create good civil-military integration development environment through the establishment of perfect incentive, supervision and punishment mechanism and play the role of macroeeonomic regulation and control , and it can promote innovation system to achieve Pareto optimality.

关 键 词：军工企业 民营企业 政府支持 复制动力学 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：E0-054[军事—军事理论]