地方政府监管与稀土上游企业的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis on local government supervision and rare earth upstream enterprises

作　　者：宋之杰[1] 郭燕平[1] 崔冬初[1] 

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《科研管理》2014年第8期145-152,共8页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金专项基金项目稀土产业整合与升级研究(基金号:71241026)

摘　　要：地方政府监管部门和稀土上游企业是规范稀土上游市场的两个重要主体,二者的利益博弈具有一定的动态性。本文建立了地方政府监管部门和稀土上游企业的演化博弈模型,并运用matlab软件对研究结果进行仿真分析,研究发现,降低地方政府监管部门的监管成本,加大对稀土上游企业不合法行为的惩罚力度,增加中央政府对地方政府的补贴、提高稀土上游企业良好外部关系收益,有助于规范稀土上游市场秩序。Local government regulators and rare earth upstream enterprises are two important bodies in the rare earth upstream regulating market,and the interests of them both have a certain dynamic. In this paper,we established the evolutionary game model of local government regulators and rare earth upstream and then used matlab simulation software to analyze the findings.We found out that it is helpful to regulate the rare earth upstream market order by lowering the regulatory costs of local government regulatory authorities,increasing the punishment of upstream rare earth＇s illegal behavior,increasing the central government＇s subsidies to local governments and building a good external relationship for the rare earth upstream companies.

关 键 词：稀土上游企业 地方政府监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]