基于政府补贴的浅层地温能开发利用博弈分析  

A Game Model on the Utilization of Shallow Geothermal Energy Based on Government Subsidies

作　　者：陈安国[1] 马乐乐[2] 周吉光[3] 

机构地区：[1]石家庄经济学院图书馆,河北石家庄050031 [2]石家庄经济学院研究生学院,河北石家庄050031 [3]石家庄经济学院学术传播中心,河北石家庄050031

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2014年第6期56-59,共4页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：2012年度河北省社会科学基金项目"能源矿产资源参与低碳经济建设的宏观调控战略机制研究"(HB12YJ052);2014年度河北省社会科学基金项目"杰文斯悖论的经验性检验及对资源开发利用模式的启示"(HB14L5004)

摘　　要：假设市场上有使用传统能源的生厂商1和开发浅层地温能的生产商2,生产商1生产的产品绿色度较低,其价格也相应的较低,而生产商2生产的产品绿色度高,但价格较昂贵。基于政府补贴的角度,利用博弈论方法,建立政府和两个生产商的博弈模型。研究结果表明:随着消费者环保意识的增强,政府提高市场最低绿色度准入值,生产商2的市场份额会逐渐增加,而生产商1的市场份额会逐渐缩小,即政府提高市场最低绿色度准入值对生厂商2更有利。The article supposes that there are two kinds of manufacturer on the market,the manufacturer of using traditional energy and shallow geothermal energy. The products of manufacturer 1 have a lower green degree,and its price is correspondingly lower. On the contrary,the green degree of the other manufacturer＇s price is higher,and its price is also expensive. Based on government subsidies,this paper establishes a game model by considering government and two manufactures. The result shows,with the increase of consumers＇ environment-care,increasing the lowest green access value is more advantage to the manufacturers of using shallow geothermal energy.

关 键 词：政府补贴 博弈模型 浅层地温能 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]