高管人才市场治理与公司创新活动  

Governance of Managerial Labor Market and Corporate Innovation Activities

作　　者：马慧[1] 陈胜蓝[1] 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古大学经济管理学院,呼和浩特010021

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2014年第6期67-77,共11页R&D Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"资本市场治理功能对矿产行业整合及其经济后果的影响研究"(71263034);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目"终极股东特征;社会责任活动与公司绩效研究"(10XJC630003);内蒙古大学高层次人才引进科研启动项目"公司研发投入会计确认与投资者保护研究"(Z20100103)

摘　　要：外部高管人才市场对创新活动中代理问题的治理具有独特的优势.本文使用手工收集的2007—2011年中国A股上市公司的创新活动数据进行考察,研究发现:1外部高管人才市场供给在促进公司创新活动投入的同时可以提高公司的创新活动产出;2当公司聘请外部高管倾向处于较低水平时,提高外聘倾向可以促进公司增加创新活动投入和创新活动产出,而且在外部高管人才供给较高时提高外聘倾向对公司创新活动的促进作用更强;3当公司聘请外部高管倾向处于较高水平时,继续提高外聘倾向反而会降低创新活动投入、减少创新活动产出,而且在外部高管人才供给较高时提高外聘倾向对公司创新活动的削弱作用更强.本文结论有助于深入理解外部高管人才市场对公司创新活动相关代理问题的治理作用.External managerial labor market owns special advantages on the governance of agency problem in the corpo- rate innovations. Using the hand-collected sample of listed firms with R＆D activities in the period from 2007 to 2011, it examined the relationship between the R＆D investment and the governance of extemal managerial labor market to serve as an external disciplining force. It finds that CEOs invest more in R＆D as the supply of the CEO candidate in- creases,. It also find that the tendency of CEOs in a well-supplied CEO labor market to increase R＆D investment is greater when more firms in the market are hiring external CEOs. However, the tendency of CEOs in a well-supplied CEO labor market to decrease R＆D investment is greater when too many firms in the market are hiring external CEOs. It sheds light on the governance role of managerial labor market on corporate innovation activities.

关 键 词：高管人才市场 创新活动 代理问题 

分 类 号：F241.2[经济管理—劳动经济]