信号传递、信息甄别与装备承包商选择研究  

Research on Signaling Model,Screening Model and the Selection of Equipment Defense Contractors

作　　者：王成[1] 吴鸣[1] 

机构地区：[1]国防科技大学人文与社会科学学院,湖南长沙410073

出　　处：《装备学院学报》2014年第6期26-29,共4页Journal of Equipment Academy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(09&ZD067)

摘　　要：装备承包商选择是装备采办的核心内容,对装备建设发展具有决定性意义。文章运用信息经济学中的信号传递模型和信息甄别模型对装备承包商选择中信息不对称问题进行了研究,结果表明:资质等级可以成为传递承包商实力的一个重要信号,军方还可以通过合约菜单设计对承包商实力进行甄别,最后根据研究结论给出了相应的对策建议。The selection of equipment defense contractors is the core content of equipment acqui- sitions activities, which is also very important to equipment construction and development. The paper researches on information asymmetry of contractors selection by signaling model and screening model. Results show that the level of qualification is an important signal of contractors＇ ability, the military can also design a contract-menu for the contractors to screen contractors＇ ability, and finally gives the corresponding polices and recommendations based on research findings.

关 键 词：装备采办 承包商选择 信号传递模型 信息甄别模型 

分 类 号：E232[军事—军事理论]