制度如何激发社会合作——基于公共品博弈实验的前沿理论综述  

How Institutions Improve Social Cooperation——A Review of Frontier Theory and Experimental Evidence of Public Goods Game

作　　者：章平[1] 许志成 闫佳[1] 

机构地区：[1]深圳大学中国经济特区研究中心,广东深圳518060 [2]美国德克萨斯州农工大学经济学系,texas77843

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2015年第1期26-33,共8页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"公共品自愿供给中的社会偏好与惩罚机制研究"(项目编号:71203145);深圳市哲学社会科学"十二五"规划课题"深圳城中村共享资源自主治理机制研究"(项目编号:125A134)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：公共品博弈作为刻画人类社会协调与合作这两个问题的基本模型,成为经济学、管理学、政治学、人类学等跨学科的研究热点和难点。通过分析引入激励制度的公共品博弈实验研究,比较奖和罚两种制度如何改变人们的信念并影响公共品合作供给行为。将已有公共品博弈实验研究分为外部激励和内部激励(决定赏罚规则、强度和执行方式的制度)、货币激励和非货币激励(道德劝说、训斥和社会排斥),考察不同制度对于提升公共品合作供给水平的实际作用,特别是惩罚制度的社会净效率。在此基础上,述评已有研究成果的一般性结论和启示,展望有关个体偏好、社会合作和制度发育的理论和实证研究可能的创新。Public goods game,as a fundamental model that studies the coordination and cooperation in human society,has become the focus and difficulty in economics,management,political science,anthropology and other interdisciplinary researches.This paper, based on an analysis of the experimental study on public goods game introduced with incentive system,compares the respective effec-tiveness of reward and punishment on both individual belief and cooperative supply of public goods game.The existing experimental evi-dence of public goods game is summarized as external motivations and internal motivations （such as the system of the rules,strength and implement of reward and punishment）,and monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives （such as moral persuasion,moral rebukes and social exclusion）.The paper explores the actual effect of different institutions on enhancing the cooperative level of public goods supply,with the social net efficiency of the punishment system particularly studied.Based on the conclusions and general impli-cations of the existing literature,the paper proposes possible innovational topics on the theoretical and empirical researches on individu-al preferences,social co-operations and institutional development.

关 键 词：公共品博弈 合作 奖励 惩罚 内生制度 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]