基于Stackelberg博弈的协作干扰策略  

Improved Physical Layer Security with Cooperative Jamming Based on Stackelberg Game

作　　者：都晨辉[1] 宋梅[1] 王莉[1] 马跃[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学电子工程学院,北京100876 [2]北京邮电大学计算机学院,北京100876

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报》2014年第5期11-15,共5页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(61201150);国家科技重大专项项目(2012ZX03004001);北京高等学校"青年英才计划"项目(YETP0442)

摘　　要：协作干扰策略是实现物理层安全的一种重要方案.但是由于协作节点的能源有限性以及自私性,干扰服务不能无偿提供,为了使得源节点和协作节点之间取得最优的效益分配,提出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈的能效最优报偿及功率分配方案.根据所建立的双层博弈模型,证明了系统存在唯一的全局最优能效,并且给出了最优功率分配方案的闭式解.仿真结果表明,所设计的协作策略在能效方面优于平均功率分配策略,而且所提方案在多节点协作时能取得更优的表现.The secrecy rate of the source-destination link can be effectively improved with help of friendly jammers, but the jamming service is not free. Obviously, there exists a tradeoff between the friendly jam- mer and the source-destination pair. An optimal power allocation algorithm based on Stackelberg game was proposed. Based on the proposed two-level Stackelberg game model, the existence of unique globally optimal energy efficiency was proved, and the closed-form result of the optimal energy efficiency was de- rived. Simulations show that the proposed collaboration strategy is better than the average power allocation strategy in terms of energy efficiency. And multi-nodes collaboration could achieve better performance.

关 键 词：物理层安全 协作干扰 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：TN915[电子电信—通信与信息系统]