戴维森从塔斯基那里继承了什么?——戴维森与塔斯基的“真”理论之比较  

What Does Davidson Inherit from Tarski?——A Comparison Between Davidson's and Tarski's Theory of Truth

作　　者：陈晓平[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学公共管理学院哲学研究所,广州510006

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2015年第1期1-8,共8页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(10BZX020);广东省社会科学"十一五"规划项目(09C-01);广东省高校人文社科基地重大项目(10JDXM72001);中国逻辑学会学术研究重点项目(13CLZD001)

摘　　要：戴维森从塔斯基的Tx模式出发,得出一种基于经验的"真"理论,即由经验证据确立Tx语句的真实性,进而得出关于彻底解释的意义理论。戴维森的"真"理论不仅改变了塔斯基理论的逻辑性质,而且把塔斯基从意义到真的研究方向倒转过来,变成从真到意义的研究进路。戴维森从塔斯基那里真正继承的是"真"的初始概念,而塔斯基却误把Tx模式当作真之定义。Davidson starts from Tarski＇s Tx-schema and gets a theory of truth based on experience,and thereby reaches the theory of meaning about the radical interpretation. Davidson＇s theory of truth not only changes the logical property of Tarski＇s theory,but also reverses Tarski＇s research direction from meaning to truth by the one from truth to meaning. What Davidson inherits from Tarski is just the primitive concept of truth,although Tarski himself takes Tx-schema wrongly as the definition of truth.

关 键 词：戴维森 塔斯基 真 初始概念 彻底解释 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]