演绎法取代归纳法之后——重读波普尔对归纳问题的处理  

After Taking the Place of Induction by Deduction——On Popper's Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction

作　　者：吴展昭[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2015年第1期59-63,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)14XNH129

摘　　要：波普尔提出证伪学说,并认为应该用此学说取代归纳法而作为科学推理的方法。这一转变在科学哲学的历史上具有不可磨灭的重大意义。众多学者认为波普尔的方法悄悄地将归纳法从后门重新请了进来。文章正是要反对这一论点,并尝试证明波普尔的方法是彻底的演绎法,在理论上是能站得住脚的。与此同时,指出了此研究进路必须要面对的主要难题。最后,笔者从认识论的角度切入,分析波普尔对休谟问题的理解的深层思想根源。Karl Popper puts forth the theory of falsificationism which he thinks should take the place of induction as the method of scientific reasoning. This is a change of great significance in the history of philosophy. Many philosophers point out that Popper＇s strategy is a variant of induction which this paper is against. What this paper tries to demonstrate is that Popper＇s approach is essentially deductive. Meanwhile,the difficulties that Popper faces are pointed out here. Finally from the epistemic perspective,the author probes into the root of Popper＇s way of understanding Hume＇s problem.

关 键 词：波普尔 休谟归纳问题 证伪主义 概率演算 可靠性 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]