审计师成为客户高管前对未来雇主的审计更宽松吗?  

Do Auditors Treat Their Prospective Employers More Favorably Prior to the Revolving-door Employment?

作　　者：陈旭霞[1] 吴溪[2] 杨育龙[2] 

机构地区：[1]北方工业大学经济管理学院,邮政编码100144 [2]中央财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2015年第1期84-90,共7页Auditing Research

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(项目批准号:NCET-11-0754);北京市会计类专业群(改革试点)建设项目;北京市教育委员会共建项目;中央财经大学校级2011协同创新项目"注册会计师行业发展";青年科研创新团队项目"实证会计与审计"资助

摘　　要：除了个案研究,以往基于大样本的经验研究并未发现审计师在成为客户高管前对未来雇主实施了更加宽松的审计,这似乎意味着普遍而言,从审计师成为客户高管的旋转门现象并不存在有损于实际审计质量的前因。本文发现,当按以往文献的做法不区分跳槽审计师是否负责未来雇主的审计业务时,我们得到与以往文献类似的结果;而一旦作出区分后,则发现当跳槽审计师负责未来雇主的审计时,未来雇主当年的财务报表伴随着更高的盈余管理(尤其是调增利润的盈余管理)。我们还发现,跳槽审计师的宽松审计态度仅体现在对待未来雇主上,而没有体现在自己负责的其他审计客户上;跳槽审计师对未来雇主的宽松审计态度在临近跳槽年份以及更早期间都有显著体现。本研究深化了对审计师与审计客户形成雇佣关联之内在机理的理解。Except for case-based evidence, prior large sample-based archival studies fail to find that auditors treat their prospective employers more favorably prior to the revolving-door employment. This appears to suggest that in general there is no antecedent that impairs audit quality before an auditor becomes an executive of an audit client. Our study documents similar findings if we follow the approach in prior literature by not differentiating whether the turnover auditor is charged with the audit for her prospective employer. However, once we make the differentiation, we find that the audited financial statements of prospective-employer clients are associated with significantly greater magnitude of discretionary accruals （and charged with the audit for her prospective the prospective employer, but not to other treatment not only exists in the short-term particularly income-increasing accruals） when the turnover auditor is employer. We also find that the favorable treatment is only exhibited to audit clients the turnover auditor is charged with. Further, the favorable window approaching the revolving door od. Our findings improve an understanding toward the rationale of auditor-client event, but also in an earlier peri- employment association.

关 键 词：审计师 客户高管 旋转门现象 审计质量 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]