存款利率市场化条件下存款竞争与银行稳定关系研究  

Relationship between Deposit Competition and Banking Stability under the Condition of Deposit Interest Rate Marketization

作　　者：吴恒宇[1] 吴俊[1] 张宗益[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《预测》2015年第1期60-65,共6页Forecasting

摘　　要：针对理论和实务界所担忧的利率市场化所激化的存款竞争风险问题,本文基于一个两期空间竞争模型,将为传统理论所忽略,但对我国银行业吸储行为有深刻影响的银行间市场批发资金融资引入经典存款竞争框架,通过对银行融资组合行为的数理建模,明晰了存款利率市场化条件下,市场竞争对银行稳定的作用机理,并据此导出了维护系统安全的制度建设建议。研究发现:当无银行间市场约束时,存款竞争在整体上会导致银行体系脆弱性的增加;而在该约束条件下,竞争通过降低具有系统重要性的高存款市场份额银行的风险,使银行体系呈现出更强的稳定性。这启示监管当局建立及巩固银行间市场约束机制可作为未来利率市场化环境中实现银行长期稳定的一个有效路径。In responding to the worry about the risk of deposit competition raised by deposit rate marketization, this paper, based on a two-period spatial competition model, introduces the interbank wholesale funding, which has been neglected by traditional theory but has profound effect on deposit-taking behavior, into classical deposit competition framework, makes clear the mechanism of the impact of competition on bank stability under the condition of deposit rate marketization through modeling of bank ’ s portfolio behavior of financing, and accordingly derives proposals for maintaining system security. The results show that： when there is no interbank market discipline, deposit competition will lead to increased vulnerability;but when the discipline effect exits, competition will enhance the stability of banking system by lowering the risk of banks of high market share which are of systematic importance. This implies the regulation authority that interbank market discipline can act as an effective way for keeping long-term bank stability in the forthcoming environment of deposit rate marketiztiion.

关 键 词：存款利率市场化 存款竞争 银行稳定 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]