P2P网络借贷模式下的小微企业融资问题研究  

Research on the Small and Micro Enterprises Financing Problems based on P2P Lending Pattern

作　　者：邹辉霞[1] 刘义[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《商业研究》2015年第2期1-7,共7页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目;项目编号:71403191

摘　　要：本文结合小微企业融资难问题,分析P2P网络借贷的信用风险及交易可能性集合,并将信号传递博弈模型引入到P2P网络借贷行为的研究当中,分析小微企业和出借方在追求各自利益最大化的前提下达到双方利益均衡的博弈过程。研究表明:P2P网络借贷模式能够降低出借方因信用风险而造成的极端大额损失;与传统融资模式相比,P2P网络借贷模式下的交易可能性集合范围更广;小微企业在P2P网络借贷平台上发出的关于借款申请列表的信号,传递了有关小微企业真实履约能力的主要信息。Combining the financing problem of the small and micro enterprises, this paper analyzes the credit risk and the trading possibility collection of the P2P network lending firstly. Then the further analysis is the game process of benefit equilibrium between the small and micro enterprises and the lenders on the premise that both of them are pursing maximum self - benefit, which is based on the introduction of the signal game model in the research of the P2P network lend- ing. The results are as follows： the P2P network lending model can reduce the extreme large losses caused by the credit risk ; compared with the traditional financing model, the range of the trading possibility collection under the P2P network lending model can be wilder; the signals about the list of loan application, which is given by the small and micro enterprises through the P2P network lending platform, transmit the main information about the real ability of the small and micro enterprises.

关 键 词：P2P网络借贷 小微企业 信用风险 交易可能性集合 信号传递博弈 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]