服务业FDI政策的政治经济学分析——基于“社会市场经济”国家视角  

A Political Economic Analysis of FDI Policy in Services from the View of“Social Market Economy”

作　　者：谢慧[1] 黄建忠[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2015年第2期67-76,共10页International Economics and Trade Research

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(13JZD010)

摘　　要：文章对"保护待售"模型进行扩展,以FDI进入状况为观测变量,构建"社会市场经济"国家服务业FDI政策的政治经济学模型,以期解释一个以国有企业为经济主体的国家对服务贸易保护的根源。结果表明,服务业FDI的进入虽受歧视性限制措施和国内规制的影响,但歧视性限制措施并不直接影响政府目标函数的设定,且国有企业利益本质上与政府利益一致。基于政府目标函数最大化原则,各利益集团的权重越大,政府在制定贸易政策时越重视该集团的利益。鉴于服务贸易自由化不可逆转,"社会市场经济"国家的服务业FDI政策需在国有企业利益、市场竞争效率、政策模式发展及转变中寻求谨慎性平衡。Taking FDI in services as an observed variable and extending the ＂protection for sale＂ model, the paper explains the underlying reason of services trade policy in a country with its economy dominated by state-owned enterprises. The FDI entry decision is affected by discriminatory restrictions and domestic regulations, but the government does not get revenues from discriminatory restrictions on FDI. Interests of state-owned enterprises play a significant role in the government＇s objective function. According to the principle of objective function maximization, the greater the weighting of an interest group is, the more the government will value its interests in the formulation of trade policies. In view of the irreversible tendency of services trade liberalization, FDI policy in services industry in a ＂social market economy＂ should strike a balance between the benefit of state- owned enterprises and the efficiency of market competition and the development and transformation of policy.

关 键 词：服务贸易 服务业FDI 服务贸易壁垒 社会市场经济 政治经济学 

分 类 号：F746[经济管理—国际贸易]