债权人监督与控股股东代理成本  

Creditor Supervision and Agency Cost of Controlling Shareholders

作　　者：苏玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学会计学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第1期49-59,共11页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71362033);新疆维吾尔自治区社会科学基金项目(13BGL030);新疆财经大学博士基金项目(2013BS016)

摘　　要：以2008—2010年我国上市公司为研究样本,建立实证模型进行分析。研究发现:对于国有公司,银行监督能有效降低控股股东代理成本。而对于非国有控股公司,银行债权人治理则表现出无效。在引入内部治理因素考察对控股股东代理成本的影响时发现,银行监督的治理效应显著,股权制衡也具有显著的控制效应。法律环境对控股股东代理成本抑制作用不显著。With the research sample of China＇s listed companies during the years from 2008 to 2010, an empirical model is established to make an analysis. This study finds that bank supervision can effectively govern the agency cost of controlling share- holders in the state-owned companies. For the non-state-owned holding companies, bank creditor governance is nullified. With the introduction of internal governance model to examine the impact on agency cost of controlling shareholders, bank supervision is found to have a significant governance effect. Equity check and balance has also a significant control effect. Legal environment does not significantly inhibit the agency cost of controlling shareholders.

关 键 词：债权人监督 控股股东 代理成本 

分 类 号：F234.3[经济管理—会计学]