政治联系的独立董事有助于中国民营上市公司涉入高壁垒行业吗?  被引量:15

Do Politically Connected Independent Directors Held Chinese Listed Private Firms Enter High-Barrier Industries?

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作  者:杜兴强[1] 曾泉[1] 杜颖洁[1] 

机构地区:[1]厦门大学管理学院会计系

出  处:《中国会计与财务研究》2014年第4期90-146,共57页China Accounting and Finance Review

基  金:作者特别感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见.本文初稿曾入选2012年在上海交通大学召开的CAFR国际研讨会,作者感谢李增泉教授的精彩点评与宝贵意见.此外,作者感谢国家自然科学基金项目(71072053)、教育部人文社科基地重大项目(13JJD790027)和福建省社会科学重点项目(2010A012)的资助.

摘  要:本文手工收集了2004至2010年中国民营上市公司的独立董事与CEO的政治联系的数据,研究了政治联系的独立董事对公司涉入高壁垒行业的影响。本文的研究结果表明:(1)政治联系的独立董事显著提高了民营上市公司涉入高壁垒行业的概率,并显著提高了民营上市公司涉入高壁垒行业的程度一高壁垒行业收入的比重。(2)与政治联系的CEO相比,政治联系的独立董事对民营上市公司涉入高壁垒行业的影响无论从统计意义上还是经济意义上均显著更高。(3)独立董事的政治联系的强度越高,对民营上市公司涉入高壁垒行业的影响越大。(4)独立董事拥有的中央与地方层级的政治联系对民营上市公司涉入高壁垒行业具有显著为正的影响。(5)就对民营上市公司涉入高壁垒行业而言,无论是政治联系的强度与政治联系的层级,政治联系的独立董事的影响均大于政治联系的CEO的影响。本文的研究,拓宽了政治联系研究的范畴。On the basis of hand-collected data on political connections, this study examines the impact of politically connected independent directors on Chinese listed private firms' entry into high-barrier industries. Our findings reveal the following: (1) politically connected independent directors are significantly positively associated with the likelihood and the degree of Chinese listed private firms' entry into high-barrier industries; (2) in comparison with politically connected chief executive officers (CEOs), the influence of politically connected independent directors on Chinese listed private firms' entry into high-barrier industries is more pronounced in terms of both statistical and economic significance; (3) the rank of politically connected independent directors is significantly positively associated with the likelihood and the degree of Chinese listed private firms' entry into high-barrier industries; (4) both the central- and local-level political connections of independent directors significantly impact the likelihood and the degree of Chinese listed private firms' entry into high-barrier industries; (5) the influence of politically connected independent directors on the likelihood and the degree of Chinese listed private firms' entry into high-barrier industries is greater than that of politically connected CEOs regardless of the rank and the level of political connections. Our study extends the extant literature on political connections.

关 键 词:独立董事 CEO 政治联系 行业壁垒 

分 类 号:F23[经济管理—会计学] F273.7[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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