政治影响力、财政分权与地方政府公务员规模  

Political Influence, Fiscal Decentralization and Civil Servants Scale of Local Governments

作　　者：陈志广[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学政府管理学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《当代财经》2015年第2期22-33,共12页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"基于治理视角的我国地方政府财政支出效率研究"(13YJA630009)

摘　　要：中国地方政府的公务员规模受到政府间政治关系和财政关系的显著影响。地方相对于中央的政治影响力由关联中央委员的政治影响力加总而来,它对"官民比"指示的公务员规模发挥正向作用。地方相对于中央的财政分权,测度指标包括收入分权、支出分权和财政依赖,亦均对公务员规模发挥正向作用。因此,控制和优化地方政府公务员规模,可行的策略包括优化各种权责利配置、加强和改进党的领导、完善地方自主制度建设和推进政务信息公开工作。The intergovernmental political relations and the fiscal relations have significant impacts on the civil servants scale of China＇s local governments. Compared to the political influence of the central government which is the total political influence related to the members of the Central Com- mittee, the local governments can play a positive role in the civil servants scale indicated by the ＂ratio between officials and people＂ . Compared with the fiscal decentralization of the central govern- ment, the measuring indicators of local governments, including revenue decentralization, expenditure decentralization and fiscal dependence, also play a positive role in the expansion of civil servants scale. Therefore, the feasible strategies to be used to control and optimize the civil servants scale of local governments include optimizing and balancing all kinds of power, responsibility and interest, strengthening and improving Party＇s leadership, improving the construction of local autonomy system, and promoting the work of government information disclosure.

关 键 词：财政分权 公务员规模 政治影响力 财政依赖 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]