产业技术创新战略联盟投机行为研究  

Resdarch of Speculation of Strategy Alliance for Industrial Technology Innovation

作　　者：李瑞光[1,2] 段万春[1] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650093 [2]云南省应用技术研究院,云南昆明650051

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2015年第2期12-15,共4页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：2012年云南省政府系统决策咨询课题(2012-13)

摘　　要：文章将博弈论与系统动力学相结合,构建了产业技术创新战略联盟投机行为博弈的系统动力学模型,以政府监督管理为研究视角,对政府监督管理抑制产业技术创新战略联盟投机行为的作用机理进行了分析。通过系统动力学仿真得出,政府主管部门对投机盟员惩罚力度、惩罚机制等因素直接影响产业技术创新战略联盟投机行为的演化结果。政府主管部门对盟员投机行为的惩罚力度大小与产业技术创新战略联盟投机行为演化过程的动态性密切相关,动态惩罚机制在投机行为演化的波动性控制方面具有明显效果。最后建议政府主管部门针对产业技术创新战略联盟运行中存在的投机行为问题,发挥监督管理职能,采取惩罚措施以有效抑制投机行为,增强产业技术创新战略联盟的运行稳定性。From research aspects of government regulation, a SD model of alliance opportunism gaming was formed by combining gaming theory and SD to describe alliance opportunism behavior problems and dynamic characters of government and alliance members＇ opportunism behavior. The SD simulation results show that punishment, punishment mechanism and other factors directly affect the evolution results of speculative of strategy alliance for industrial technology innovation. Government penalties for speculation are closely related to the dynamics of the evolution process, and the dynamic mechanism of punishment has obvious effect on controlling w）latility of speculation evolution. It was recommended that government should exert the function of supervision and management, take punitive measures to effectively curb speculative behavior, enhance stability of strategy alliance for industrial technology innovation.

关 键 词：产业技术 技术创新 战略联盟 惩罚策略 

分 类 号：F426.6[经济管理—产业经济]