施密特对马克思自然观的批判与继承——基于《马克思的自然概念》  

Schmidt's Criticism and Inheritance on Marxist Natural View——Based on Marx's Concept of Nature

作　　者：高锐[1] 

机构地区：[1]延安大学学报编辑部,陕西延安716000

出　　处：《商洛学院学报》2015年第1期3-7,40,共6页Journal of Shangluo University

摘　　要：施密特在《马克思的自然概念》一书中首先继承了马克思关于自然界对人类具有先在性问题,来确立他唯物主义的立场。关于社会与自然的关系,施密特从非本体论的层面提出了自然与社会"互为中介"的一对逆命题。其实,马克思在理解自然概念时,既从物质层面注重自然的先在性和客观实在性,又从实践角度强调自然所具有的社会历史特征。社会无论作为自然界的一部分,还是作为自然界的对立物,都可以中介自然;但自然只有作为社会的外部环境和生产要素时才能中介社会,当把自然看作全部存在物的总和的自然时,它包含人类社会,总体中介部分显然在逻辑上行不通。所以,施密特的这个"双向中介"理论中的"自然"的内涵不同,把它作为一对逆命题来理解社会与自然的关系是不符合马克思的原意。Schmidt first inherits Marx＇s idea of nature first to human beings in Marx＇s Concept of Nature so as to establish his materialistic stance. In the analysis of the relation between society and nature, Schmidt puts forward a pair of converse propositions of mutual intermediary relation between society and nature at the level of non-ontology. In fact, Marx＇s concept of nature not only focuses on nature＇s first position and objective reality at the material level, but also emphasizes the social and historical features of nature at the level of practice. Society, whether it is a part of nature or the anti-thing of nature, can mediate nature; but only when nature is the external environment and productive factor can it mediate society. When nature is regarded as the sum of all entities, it includes human society, it can not be a general mediator logically. Therefore, the connotation of nature in Schmidt ＂bidirectional intermediary theory＂ is different, it is a distorted understanding of Marx＇s concept of nature if nature is taken as a pair of converse propositions to understand the relation between society and nature.

关 键 词：施密特 马克思的自然概念 先在性 “双向中介”理论 本体论 非本体论 

分 类 号：A811.6[哲学宗教—马克思主义哲学]