管理者过度自信与会计稳健性研究--来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Managers' Overconfidence and the Accounting Conservatism:Empirical Evidence from the Listed Companies in China

作　　者：李四海[1] 汤雨晴[2] 宋献中[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院 [2]暨南大学

出　　处：《投资研究》2014年第10期41-55,共15页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目号:71272213,71372166)的资助

摘　　要：本文利用2009-2011年A股上市公司数据,实证检验过度自信对会计非条件稳健性和条件稳健性的影响,研究发现由于会计管制的存在,过度自信没有损害会计的非条件稳健性,在高负债融资、低股利分配率等决策因素的影响下,管理者过度自信加强了会计的条件稳健性增强。本文的研究从行为经济学角度丰富了会计稳健性研究的相关文献。Choosing the A-share listed companies in China from 2009-2011 as a study sample, we empirically test the influence of overconfidence on the accounting conditional and non-conditional conservatism. We find that the overconfidence doesn＇ t damage the accounting non-conditional conservatism because of the accounting regulation. However, the managers＇ overconfi- dence is affected by the high debt financing and low dividend payout ratio, which enhances the accounting conditional conser- vatism. The study enriches the literature on accounting conservatism from the perspective of economics.

关 键 词：过度自信 条件稳健性 非条件稳健性 行为经济学 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275