佃农分成理论与地权管制范式  

Tenancy Share Theory and Land Rights Regulation Paradigm

作　　者：何一鸣[1] 罗必良[1] 高少慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642

出　　处：《财经论丛》2015年第2期99-104,共6页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71333004;41301106);国家社科基金资助项目(12CJY050);广东省普通高校人文社会科学研究资助项目(2012WYXM_0011);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(S2012040007386);广东省软科学计划面上资助项目(2013B070206039)

摘　　要：新佃农理论推翻了传统佃农理论关于分成契约效率低下的观点。其实,传统观点的不严谨之处主要是未能考虑真实世界中的风险费用。所以,只要把风险因素统一到交易费用范畴当中也可证明分成契约的有效性。尽管地主的租金收益权利被管制而造成租金耗散,但佃农之间的竞争效应使得佃农劳动投入增加从而农业总产出提高。若交易费用分为外生性与内生性两种,则可以进一步以此划分地权管制的效率边界,而地权适度管制是具有机会主义倾向的人们在资源属性约束下最小化总交易费用的一种理性选择行为范式。因此,地权管制的程度与范围随着交易费用的转变而改变。New tenancy theory refutes the view of conventional tenancy theory that sharing contract is low in efficiency.In fact,the problem with the conventional theory is that it has not considered the risk cost in the real world. So,if the risk factor is integrated into the transactional cost,the efficiency of sharing contract can be proved as well. Although the regulation of landlord's rent revenue right causes rent dissipation,the effect of tenants' competition becomes an incentive to increase their labor inputs and improve gross agriculture production levels. If the transactional cost is divided into the two types of exogenous and endogenous ones,we can thereby demarcate the efficiency boundary of land right regulation. And appropriate regulation of land right is a behavior paradigm of rational choice made by the opportunist minimizing gross transactional costs under the constraint of resource attribute.

关 键 词：佃农理论 分成契约 地权管制 租金耗散 

分 类 号：F320.5[经济管理—产业经济]