超市通道费:现实与逻辑  

Slotting Allowance of Supermarkets: Reality and Logic

作　　者：刘向东[1] 李子文[1] 王庚[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2015年第2期5-11,共7页Journal of Business Economics

摘　　要：超市收取通道费行为是否合理、是否应受到规制的问题已成为业界和学术界争论的焦点。通过对于超市业的实地调研,文章归纳了现实中的通道费模式,并指出该通道费模式与已有研究中的通道费设定有本质区别。在此基础上,文章分析了现实中通道费行为的经济学逻辑,得出了销量的不确定性是收取通道费的根本原因以及市场势力大、运营能力弱且不愿意承担风险的超市倾向于采取通道费模式的结论。最后,文章指出通道费模式本身作为一种正常的零售运营模式,不应直接纳入政府规制的范畴。The retailing industry and academics have been arguing about the rationality and regulation of supermarkets charging slotting allowance. Through the field research on several supermarkets, this article summarizes the mode of slotting allowance in re- ality and finds that the mode in reality is essentially different from the results of other existing research. On this basis, the research- ers proceed to analyze the economics logic of slotting allowance mode in reality and finally comes to the conclusion that the uncertain- ty of the sales directly leads to the charging of slotting allowance and that supermarkets with strong market power, weak operation ca- pabilities and risk aversion inclination tend to adopt the mode of slotting allowance. In the end, this article points out that slotting al- lowance mode, as a normal mode of retail operation, should not fall under the category of direct government regulation agencies.

关 键 词：通道费 不确定性 市场势力 运营能力 

分 类 号：F724.2[经济管理—产业经济]