论波普尔的思想实验观  

On Popper's View of Thought Experiments

作　　者：赵煦[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学马克思主义学院,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2015年第1期52-58,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"当代科学前沿背景下的思想实验研究"(项目编号:12CZX015);江苏省社科基金项目"霍金的时空实在论思想研究"(项目编号:12ZXD015);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2014B19514)

摘　　要：波普尔认为,当一个理论面临批判时,用思想实验来加以反驳,常会走向狡辩,因此是非法的。他对此类思想实验持排斥的态度。波普尔的思想实验观——特别是他所谓的狡辩式的思想实验的主张源于他对理想化导致不确定性后果的担心,是存在严重问题的。事实上,思想实验即为条件理想化的科学实验,其中错误因素主要来源于对条件考虑的不完善,而非理想化所致。理想化是思想实验的本质属性。Popper believes that by using thought experiments to make a refutation when a theory is being criticized, we tend to be sophistical, which is illegitimate. He holds a negative attitude towards such thought experiments. Popper＇s view of thought experiments is problematic, especially when the view stems from his misgivings that idealization will bring about uncertain consequences. As a matter of fact, thought experiments are scientific experiments whose conditions are idealized, in which errors mainly come from the imperfect consideration about the conditions rather than the idealization. Idealization is the essence of thought experiments.

关 键 词：狡辩式的思想实验 理想化 实验条件 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]