邻避冲突、外部性及其政府治理的经济手段研究  

On the Economic Approaches for Regulating NIMBY Conflicts and Externalities

作　　者：周亚越[1] 俞海山[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学政治与公共管理学院,教授杭州310023 [2]浙江外国语学院 [3]浙江外国语学院科研处,处长杭州310012

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2015年第2期54-59,156-157,共6页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71273168);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJA630178)资助

摘　　要：邻避冲突是历史的产物,从未来我国生态环境状况与公众环境诉求之间的矛盾来看,我国的邻避冲突可能会愈演愈烈。邻避冲突的根本原因是邻避项目存在负外部性。以经济手段治理邻避项目负外部性的机理在于:一方面,经济补偿会减少邻避项目的过度供给;另一方面,经济补偿能减少公众对兴建邻避项目的阻力。以经济手段治理邻避冲突主要有市场拍卖方式和市场谈判方式两种,但无论是哪一种方式,均以公众有较强的组织化程度、决策参与意识以及政府和企业的诚信为前提。NIMBY( not-in-my-backyard) conflicts are the products of history. In the view of the conflicts between the environment and the public demand,the NIMBY conflicts will become even more violent.The fundamental reason is the negative externalities caused by the NIMBY projects. The mechanism of using economic approaches to reduce the negative externalities is to lower the excess supply of NIMBY projects and reduce the public resistance against those projects. There are two major approaches,auction market and negotiation market. However,either approach requires the public to have strong degree of organization,sense of participation as well as strong credibility of government and businesses.

关 键 词：邻避冲突 外部性 经济手段 治理 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]