两类无证书签名方案的密码学分析  

Cryptanalysis of Two Certificateless Signature Schemes

作　　者：吴晨煌[1] 黄慧[2] 陈智雄[1] 

机构地区：[1]莆田学院数学学院,福建莆田351100 [2]闽南师范大学计算机科学学院,福建漳州363000

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2015年第2期190-197,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61373140;61170246);福建省省属高校专项课题(JK2013044);莆田学院教改项目(JG2012020)

摘　　要：对新近侯红霞等人发表在《山东大学学报》(理学版)的无证书聚合签名方案进行了分析,给出了两种攻击方法,在这种攻击方式下,KGC具有与签名人同样的能力,能做到对任意选择的消息生成有效签名.另外,对秦艳琳等人发表在《通信学报》上的无证书多重签名方案进行了分析,发现任何人都可以对该签名方案进行攻击.最后,分析指出了存在这些攻击的根本原因.所给出的这些攻击方法,对于无证书签名的构造和安全性分析具有借鉴意义.A certificateless aggregate signature shcheme recently proposed by HOU Hongxia et al. is cryptanalyzed, which is published on Journal of Shandong University（Natural Science）. There are two kinds of attacks in their scheme. In these two attacks, KGC have the same ability as the signer, who can generate a valid signature on any selected message. Moreover, an efficient certificateless sequential multi-signature scheme is cryptanalyzed, which is published on Journal on Communications. As a result, anyone can carry out the attack on this scheme. Finally, the main reason of the existence of these attacks is provided. Furthermore, the attack methods in this paper have valuable reference to the construction and security analysis of certificateless signature schemes.

关 键 词：无证书 聚合签名 多重签名 攻击 双线性对 

分 类 号：TN918.4[电子电信—通信与信息系统]