存货影响销售量的两阶段供应链的VMI协调  

Two-stage VMI Supply Chain Coordination with Stock-dependent Demand for Products

作　　者：田立平[1] 孙群[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院信息学院,北京101149

出　　处：《工业工程》2015年第1期84-89,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：智能物流系统北京市重点实验室资助项目(BZ0211);北京市高层次人才创新创业计划支持项目-教学名师项目;北京物资学院高级科研项目培育基金项目(GJB20141004)

摘　　要：研究在VMI环境下存货影响销售量的单供应商、单零售商的两阶段供应链的协调问题。建立了集中决策下的供应链模型,求出了整体供应链的利润函数;在分散决策下,采用收益共享契约对供应链进行协调,按Stackelberg博弈方式进行建模分析,发现收益共享契约无法协调供应链,即在利益分配上,与供应商相比,零售商获得了更多的供应链收益,而且分散式系统的收益始终低于集中决策下的水平;采用Nash协商对VMI供应链进行协调,完成了供应商和零售商收益的帕累托改进,不仅实现供应链的协调,而且达到了集中决策下的水平,最后通过算例进行了验证。The coordination of one supplier and one retailer supply chain based on the product with stockdependent demand under the environment of VMI （vendor managed inventory） mode is discussed in three steps. Firstly, a model of supply chain is established under centralized decision and the profit function of the whole supply chain worked out. Secondly, in the decentralized decision, the method of revenue sharing contract is used to coordinate the supply chain, according to the Stackelberg game. It is found that the method of revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. In the distribution of benefits, the retailer gain more benefits than supplier of the supply system is always lower than the centralized decision used to coordinate Vendor Managed chain, and the total income of decentralized decision system. Finally, the method of Nash negotiation is Inventory supply chain, with the profit of centralized decision-making achieved and Pareto improvement realized. Under the condition of stock-dependent demand, the conclusion is that the method of Nash negotiation can coordinate Vendor Managed Inventory supply chain and achieve the optimal profits. At last , the conclusion is verified by examples.

关 键 词：存货影响销售量 供应商管理库存(VMI) 收益共享契约 Nash协商 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]