股权分置改革中支付对价合理性反思——基于金融约束政策租金视角  

Reasonability of Non-tradable Share Reform:Based on the Policy Rent of Financial Restraint

作　　者：刘郁葱[1] 黄飞鸣[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门城市职业学院,福建厦门361008 [2]江西财经大学,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《财贸研究》2015年第2期110-117,共8页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"金融约束的居民消费抑制和经济动态效率研究"(71263017);福建省社会科学规划项目"房产交易新政的实施对我省中低收入阶层财产性收入的影响与对策研究"(2013B184));国家社科基金项目"财政货币政策在提高居民消费中的动态反馈协调机制研究"(14BJY152)

摘　　要：股权分置改革及其过程中存在的问题所产生的长期后续效应制约了中国股票市场的良性发展。将基于银行信贷市场中管制利率和限制竞争等政策行为而提出的金融约束理论扩展到证券市场,并对中国股权分置改革中支付对价的不合理性进行分析,结果表明:金融约束政策租金的大小与支付对价不合理性程度之间存在紧密的联系,政策租金经IPO高定价行为与股权分置政策得以累积,又通过股权分置改革中不合理的对价支付水平而得以释放;通过建立一个合理对价率模型以测算合理对价率与实际对价率的偏离度程度,核算出非流通股股东对流通股股东侵占的政策租金规模。Problems that the non -tradable share reform has brought restricts the healthy development of China＇s stock market. The article expands the theory of financial restraint based on the policy such as in- terest rates controls and restrict competition on the bank credit market to the stock market, and analyzes the irrationality of consideration payment in China non - tradable share reform. There is a close link between the size of policy rent and the degree of unreasonable consideration. And policy rent has been accumulated by the high pricing behavior in IPO and the policy of non - tradable shares, and released by the level of unrea- sonable consideration in the reform of non - tradable shares. Then using a model of reasonable consideration rate to measure the rent scale in the stock market, thus accounting and proving the large rent scale and its plunder of tradable-share holders.

关 键 词：股权分置改革 合理对价 金融约束 政策租金 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]