学部制改革背景下高校委托-代理问题研究  

Principal-Agent Research in the Colleges and Universities Based on the Faculty System Reform

作　　者：何翔[1] 田川[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通工程学院经济管理系,陕西西安710300

出　　处：《昭通学院学报》2015年第1期106-108,共3页Journal of Zhaotong University

摘　　要：近年来,高校学科交叉与融合的步伐逐步加快,为迎合这种学科发展需要,国内很多高校进行了学部制改革。学部制改革取得一些成就,同时也产生了一些新的问题。学部制改革后高校的委托代理层次发生了变化,代理层次的增加使得高校内部管理成本增加、教育寻租、共谋行为等问题出现。论文试图从以下三个方面降低高校委托-代理风险:第一,创立"兼任制",有效地降低管理成本;第二,加强教育监督,有效提高教育寻租成本;第三,建立薪酬激励制度,提高代理人的忠诚度,避免共谋行为。In recent years,the pace of university discipline overlapping and integration gradually accelerated,to cater to the development needs,many domestic colleges and universities carry on the faculty reform.Some achievements have been made in reform of the division system,at the same time,also produce some new problems.After the faculty reform,principal-agent levels of colleges and universities have changed,the increasing of principal-agent levels lead to the increasing of internal management costs of colleges and universities,the educational rent-seeking,conspiratorial conducts and other problems.This article attempts to reduce the risk of agency by agreement of colleges and universities in the following three aspects.Firstly,create a’part-time system’,effectively reduce management costs;secondly,strengthen the education supervision,improve the cost of education rent-seeking;thirdly,establish the compensation incentive system,improve agents’ loyalty and avoid conspiratorial conducts.

关 键 词：学部制 委托-代理 教育寻租 共谋行为 

分 类 号：G649.2[文化科学—高等教育学]