基于纳什谈判的合作研发利益分配模型  

Profit Distribution Model of Collaborative R&D Based on Nash Bargaining

作　　者：代建生[1] 范波[2] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,昆明650093 [2]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆400047

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2015年第1期35-43,共9页R&D Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目"区域创新体系发展中科技资源优化配置与高效利用机制设计研究"(08AJY028);中国博士后科学基金资助项目"有限理性下产学研合作研发防合谋激励机制设计"(2012M511909)

摘　　要：运用纳什谈判模型,考察了双边道德风险下合作研发的两部线性分成问题,分析了研发效率、协同创造能力和谈判能力对利益分配的影响.研究发现,谈判能力确定双方最终从合作中能分享多少利益,而研发效率和协同创造能力确定最优线性分配比例.考察了协同创造能力和研发效率对研发投入和研发收益的影响,指出协同能力的增强将增大双方的研发投入和合作研发的总收益,而合作一方研发效率的下降将减少自身的研发投入并减少合作研发实现的总收益.最后,提供了一个案例来阐释理论模型在现实中的应用.Based on Nash bargaining model, it investigated the issue of profit distribution via two-part tariffs for collaborative R＆D with bilateral moral hazard. It analysed the impacts of the participants＇ R＆D capabilities, synergistic creativity capability and bargaining powers on profit distribution. It concludes that the final share of profit distribution is determined exclusively by the participants＇ bargaining power, and the optimal linear distribution ratio is determined jointly by the participants＇ R＆D capabilities and synergistic creativity capability. It explores the impact of synergistic creativity capability and R＆D capabilities on R＆D investments and R＆D income, and points out that both R＆D investments and the total R＆D income increase as synergistic creativity capability goes up. Furthermore, as one participant＇s R＆D capability decreases, its R＆D investment and the total R＆D income decrease. At last, a case analysis was presented to illustrate the application of the theoretical model in the real world.

关 键 词：合作研发 线性合约安排 纳什谈判 双边道德风险 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] F224.0