加工企业主导型粮食供应链中粮农风险共担契约研究  

Coordination Contract of Grain Farmers Risk Sharing in the Dominant Grain Supply Chain of Processing Enterprise

作　　者：冷志杰[1] 田静[1] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江八一农垦大学经济管理学院,大庆163319

出　　处：《黑龙江八一农垦大学学报》2014年第5期82-85,共4页journal of heilongjiang bayi agricultural university

基　　金：黑龙江省社科基金(12B027)

摘　　要：在原粮生产随机和产成品市场需求随机的环境下,为增强粮食供应链的整体竞争力,需要粮食加工企业与种粮农户构建协调契约。以加工企业为核心,根据Stackelberg博弈理论,研究与粮农风险共担的协调契约条件。在保障种粮农户的最优利润前提下,从供应链整体利益最大的视角,求出最优订购量,分析得出粮食加工企业可通过风险共担契约中惩罚系数的设定,达到选择具有规模生产及长久履约能力的种粮农户的目的;种粮农户不能履约带来的额外集货成本会损害供应链整体利益;按产出进行政府补贴也使得种粮农户分担企业更多风险。Under the random environment of grain production and products market demand,the processing enterprise should build coordination contract with grain farmer to enhance the supply chain competitiveness. According to Stackelberg game theory,the processing enterprise as the core would build risk-sharing contract with grain farmer. Based on the protecting grain farmer and processing enterprise＇s best profits,the optimal order quantity was obtained. The analytical results showed that the n processing enterprise might choose the scale of production and ability to perform the long grain farmers through setting up risk-sharing contract penalty coefficient. If grain farmers failed to keep the contract,extra set of the collected goods costs would undermine the best profits supply chain,but government subsidies could share more risk-sharing.

关 键 词：粮食供应链 契约 协调 风险共担 

分 类 号：F327[经济管理—产业经济]