非效率投资、审计监督与股价崩盘风险  

Inefficient Investment,Audit Oversight and Stock Price Crash Risk

作　　者：田昆儒[1] 孙瑜[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2015年第2期43-51,共9页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：选取2008年至2013年A股上市公司的数据,研究非效率投资行为可能引发的经济后果,并研究了审计监督对非效率投资行为经济后果的影响。实证研究表明,在其他条件一定的情况下,管理层的非效率投资状况越严重,就越有动机向外界隐瞒其代理动机和利益侵占行为等负面消息,造成上市公司未来的股价崩盘风险越高。独立审计作为公司治理的外部监督主体与保证机制,能够通过缓解代理问题和降低代理成本,显著抑制非效率投资对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究结论表明防范和化解股市的风险需要从上市公司代理问题的源头上做起这一政策性意义。This paper discussed the relationship between inefficient investment and stock price crash risk and the effects of au- dit supervision of economic consequences of inefficient investment behavior based on a sample of 2008 - 2013A-share listed companies. Research conclusions are as follows： The more severe the inefficient investment, the more motivated to conceal their negative news to cover agency motives and expropriation behavior the management is, the higher the future stock price crash risk will be. Independent audit of high quality can significantly inhibit the effects of inefficient investment on stock price crash risk, which proved as an independent external oversight and auditing mechanisms has the function of corporate govern- ance. Findings show the policy implications that the risk of the stock market need to be avoided and resolved from the sources of listed companies＇ proxy issues.

关 键 词：非效率投资 股价崩盘风险 审计监督 代理动机 利益侵占行为 公司治理 独立审计 经济后果 

分 类 号：F235.99[经济管理—会计学]