Environment-Dependent Payoffs in Finite Populations  

作　　者：徐微鸿 张艳玲 谢广明 封雪 

机构地区：[1]Center for Systems and Control,State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems,College of Engineering,Peking University

出　　处：《Chinese Physics Letters》2015年第2期160-162,共3页中国物理快报（英文版）

摘　　要：In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the cases of environment-dependent payoff matrices which exhibit the feedback from the environment to the population. Finally, a more general law about cooperation-dominance is obtained.In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the cases of environment-dependent payoff matrices which exhibit the feedback from the environment to the population. Finally, a more general law about cooperation-dominance is obtained.

关 键 词：Environment-Dependent Payoffs in Finite Populations 

分 类 号：C92-05[社会学—人口学]