非对称国家越境污染最优控制模型  

Optimal Control Model of Trans-boundary Pollution Emissions in Two Asymmetric Countries

作　　者：刘利源 时政勗 宁立新 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院金融学院,上海201620 [2]广岛修道大学人间环境学部 [3]CI协同组合

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2015年第1期43-49,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：上海市教育委员会重点学科建设项目资助(J51703)

摘　　要：环境问题已成为世界共同面对的问题,应对越境污染需要国际合作,但发达国家和发展中国家对"共同但有区别的责任"理解上存在差异。本文是运用博弈理论研究越境污染的最优控制,基于博弈理论的线性战略和非线性战略构建非对称两国污染物质流量及污染物质存量的控制模型。微分博弈的研究分析结果表明:在一定条件下,非对称两国非合作控制污染物质排放量的稳定状态的污染物质存量小于其合作控制污染物质排放量的稳定状态的污染物质存量的可能性存在。Environmental problem has become an international issue.Handling trans-boundary pollution calls for international cooperation,but the developed countries have different understandings in the principle of ＂common but differentiated responsibilities＂ from that of the developing countries.The game theory is applied to study the optimal control of trans-boundary pollution,based on the control model of pollution flow and pollution stock between asymmetric countries under linear strategies and non-linear strategies.The findings of dynamic differential game indicate：under certain circumstances,pollution stock in the steady state of non-cooperative strategy to control pollution emissions is lower than that of cooperative strategy to control pollution emission.

关 键 词：越境污染 污染物质流量 污染物质存量 微分博弈 线性战略 非线性战略 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]