基于演化博弈理论的低碳技术创新链式扩散机制研究  

Research on Chain Diffusion of Low- carbon Technological Innovation Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：徐建中[1] 徐莹莹[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第6期17-25,共9页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"低碳经济背景下装备制造业企业行为演化与运营模式研究"(71273072);黑龙江省自然科学基金资助项目"低碳经济背景下黑龙江省装备制造业企业行为演化与运营模式研究"(G201119);黑龙江省青年科学基金项目"低碳经济下黑龙江省制造业企业核心竞争力研究"(QC2014C083)

摘　　要：基于创新扩散理论,利用演化博弈方法建立市场机制和政府规制下低碳技术创新扩散的链式过程中创新提供者与潜在采纳者间的演化博弈模型,探讨二者间相互作用对宏观扩散的影响机制。理论研究和数值仿真结果表明,市场机制下将低碳技术创新的转移价格控制在一定范围内系统才能达到低碳技术创新成功扩散的理想状态;政府规制下对创新提供者和潜在采纳者实施补贴和减税政策对低碳技术创新扩散有显著正向作用,但采取惩罚措施易导致低碳技术创新扩散的失败。The paper establishes an evolutionary game model between innovation providers and potential adopters in the chain process of low carbon technology innovation diffusion under market mechanism and government regulation based on evolutionary game theory,and explored effects of interaction between innovation providers and potential adopters on macroscopic diffusion. Theoretical study and numerical simulation show that diffusion system can achieve the ideal state when low- carbon technological innovation diffuses successfully and the price of low- carbon technological innovation transformation is controlled within a certain range. Implementation of subsidies and tax cuts has significant positive effect on low- carbon technological innovation diffusion,but punitive measures can easily lead to failure of low- carbon technological innovation diffusion.

关 键 词：低碳技术创新 链式扩散 创新提供者 潜在采纳者 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F124.5