成本扰动下零售商主导型闭环供应链生产与协调决策  

Production and Coordination in a Closed-loop Supply Chain with a Dominant Retailer under Costs Disruptions

作　　者：韩小花[1] 杨倩霞[1] 后锐[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2015年第1期100-107,114,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101032;71103044);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20104420120008)

摘　　要：在制造成本扰动下,研究了由一个制造商和一个主导型零售商组成的闭环供应链系统的最优生产决策与协调机制问题。研究发现:销售价格、产量以及回收率决策对制造成本的扰动具有一定的鲁棒性;当面临较大的制造成本正扰动时,集中化决策者和制造商都愿意调整决策,但零售商却希望保持原有决策;当面临较大的制造成本负扰动时,集中化决策者和零售商都愿意调整决策,但制造商更希望保持原有决策。两部收费制契约能够协调扰动前后的闭环供应链,但零售商获得的通道费随着制造成本的正扰动量的增加而减少,负扰动量绝对值的增加而增加。This paper studies the production and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with a dominant retailer when manufacturing costs are disrupted.The results indicate that the optimal retail price,production quantity and return rate have some robustness against manufacturing cost disruptions.We also find that the centralized decision-maker and manufacturer prefer to adjust their decisions,but the retailer tends to maintain his original decisions when facing considerably profitable disruptions;the centralized decision-maker and retailer want to adjust their decisions,but the manufacturer tends to maintain his original decisions when facing considerably harmful disruptions.The coordination of closed-loop supply chain with/without disruptions can be achieved by two-part contract; while the slotting allowances decrease with the value of positive disruptions and increase with the absolute value of negative disruptions.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 零售商主导 制造成本扰动 生产决策 两部收费制契约 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]