关于双向声誉机制的作用机理及有效性研究  

Efficiency of bilateral online reputation system

作　　者：李玲芳[1,2] 洪占卿[3,2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433 [3]中国人民银行上海总部,上海200120

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2015年第2期1-12,94,共13页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：上海市浦江人才计划资助项目(10PGC040);上海市教育委员会科研创新资助项目(13ZS055);上海财经大学博士研究生研究基金资助项目(CXJJ-2011-398)

摘　　要：通过建立博弈论模型比较了双向声誉机制中的同步声誉机制和非同步声誉机制在实现诚实评价方面的有效性.结论表明,当买家严格偏好惩罚某种类型的卖家时,非同步声誉机制产生的评价不能真实反映坏的交易结果,如果要让非同步声誉机制实现诚实评价,则需要增加诸多约束条件.另一方面,同步声誉机制能够实现诚实评价,而且当买家严格偏好惩罚某种类型的卖家时,诚实评价还是同步声誉机制唯一的均衡.This paper uses game theory models to study and compare the efficiency differences in sustaining truthful feedback between simultaneously-revealed and non-simultaneously-revealed bilateral reputation sys-tems. We find that the equilibrium feedback of the non-simultaneously-revealed bilateral reputation system does not reflect bad trading outcome when the buyers strictly prefer to punish certain type of sellers. Strict con-straints on both seller’s and buyer’s behavior are required shall non-simultaneously-revealed bilateral reputa-tion system be able to reflect bad trading. On the other hand,truthful feedback can be sustained by simultane-ously-revealed bilateral reputation system and is the only equilibrium outcome when the buyers strictly prefer to punish certain type of buyers.

关 键 词：声誉机制 网上交易 双向评价 诚信 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]