政府投资项目中招投标的监管措施研究  

Government Investment Project Bidding Supervision Supervision Measures Research

作　　者：王放[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南省住房和城乡建设厅,郑州450014

出　　处：《安阳工学院学报》2015年第1期37-40,共4页Journal of Anyang Institute of Technology

摘　　要：从引入委托-代理理论入手,提出政府投资项目招投标中存在广泛的委托-代理关系,并指出工程招投标中存在的腐败实际上就是代理人的逆向选择和道德风险。防止工程招投标腐败就是尽量减弱甚至消除代理人的逆向选择和道德风险,从而实现构建工程招投标委托-代理防腐机制的目标。This article from the introduction of the principal-agent theory, put forward a government investment project bidding widely exists in the principal-agent relationship, and points out that the existing in project bidding corruption is actually the agent＇s adverse selection and moral risk. To prevent the project bidding corruption is to weaken or even eliminate the agent＇s adverse selection and moral risk, so as to realize the construction project bidding agency control mechanisms of target.

关 键 词：政府投资项目 委托-代理理论 工程招投标 

分 类 号：TU-9[建筑科学]