财政分权不充分、竞争策略扭曲与社会救助支出：内在逻辑与中国的实际  

Fiscal Decentralization Being Insufficient Competition Strategy Being Distorted and Social Relief Spending: China's Actual Inner Logic

作　　者：王增文[1] 邓大松[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学公共管理学院、城市发展研究院,江苏南京210023 [2]武汉大学社会保障研究中心,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《社会保障研究》2015年第2期62-68,共7页Social Security Studies

基　　金：江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目;江苏省“青蓝工程”资助项目;江苏省333工程资助国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71003045)成果

摘　　要：自1994年以来,由于分税制改革不充分,地方政府无相对独立的税权,不能独立的设置税种、税率,使得地方政府在税收方面缺乏较大的收入来源,而评估地方政府绩效与本地经济发展水平是以GDP的增长率为标尺,从而导致地方政府支出结构的扭曲——经济增长的竞争策略。结果导致社会救助支出的比重反而不断下降。经验分析表明这一格局存在加强的趋势。我们认为,应该赋予地方政府更多的财政收入权,而限制其过多的财政支配权,应该加入其他方面的考核指标,以"绿色GDP"、政府在公共支出和公共服务等领域内所做出的成绩,作为评估参考地方政府官员晋升的标准。Due to the inadequate reform tax system,the local government has not the relatively independent taxation,and they also have not an independent set of taxes and tax rates,which lead the local government to be lack of large source of income on taxes since 1994. However,the performance evaluation of local government and local economic development level are based on the growth rate of GDP scale,which causes the distortion of the local government expenditure structure——competitive strategy of economic growth. As a result,the proportion of expenditure on social assistance has been falling. Empirical analysis shows that this trend has been strengthening.Thus,we should give more financial right to local government and limit the excessive fiscal authority. We believe that join other aspects of assessment indicators,such as ＂ green GDP＂,public expenditure and the public service government＇s performance,which can act as the evaluation standard for local government officials.

关 键 词：竞争策略 财政分权 激励效应 社会救助支出 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学] D632.1[政治法律—政治学]