基于延迟决策的航空公司动态价格竞争复杂性  

Complexity of Airlines′Dynamic Price Competition with Delayed Decision

作　　者：胡荣[1] 李天睿[1] 张君[1] 江超[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学民航学院,南京210016

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2015年第1期46-52,共7页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71201082);中国博士后科学基金项目(2011M500920);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2012SJD630083)

摘　　要：为深入分析延迟决策与有限理性对航空公司动态价格竞争复杂性的影响,综合运用了延迟决策与非线性动力学理论,构建了基于延迟决策的航空公司动态价格竞争模型,对模型进行了理论分析与数值仿真,研究了不同市场参数下的航空公司复杂的动力学行为。研究结果表明:较大的延迟决策权重可以扩大系统稳定域范围、缩短系统到达均衡的时间;系统处于不稳定状态时,引入延迟决策机制对航空公司更有利;一方引入延迟决策机制,会出现竞争对手'搭便车'而获取额外利润的现象;为权衡航空公司市场表现,关键是确定合理的延迟决策权重。To investigate the influence of delayed decision and bounded rationality on complexity of airlines′price competition,the airlines′dynamic price competition model based on delayed bounded rationality was established by using the theory of bifurcation of dynamic systems.Theoretic analysis and numerical simulations were provided to study the complex dynamics of this model.The results show that the larger weight of delayed decision can enlarge the stability region of the model and shorten the time of the model to reach the equilibrium points.When the model is unstable,it is more beneficial for airlines to use delayed decision.And once an airline uses delayed decision,the free-rider problem can be shown from the competitors who will get extra profits.It is important to choose a reasonable weight of delayed decision to balance airlines′market performance.

关 键 词：延迟决策 航空公司 分支理论 价格竞争 复杂性 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] N94[自然科学总论—系统科学]