领导、追随与人类合作秩序的维持  

Leadership,followership and the maintenance of human cooperation order

作　　者：赵阳[1] 姜树广[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济研究院

出　　处：《南方经济》2015年第3期38-51,共14页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目(项目号:12AZD023)的资助

摘　　要：领导-追随模式可能是维持人类合作秩序的重要机制。基于历史和演化博弈的视角,本文对相关跨学科文献进行了系统的梳理,分析显示在人类社会的各个时期,领导力都在维持社会的合作秩序中承担了核心角色。结合合作演化的研究成果分析表明,领导通过惩罚机制和日益建构起来的等级制统治可以帮助群体克服搭便车难题;利他性惩罚本质上表现为领导惩罚,合作的组织更普遍地表现为领导下的合作;同时,来自实验经济学的大量公共物品实验证据,也支持领导-追随模式可以显著地提高社会困境问题中合作水平的观点。The pattern of leadership - followership may be an important mechanism for maintaining human cooperation. Based on the perspective of evolutionary game and historical analysis, this paper systematically reviews broad interdisciplinary literatures, which shows that in different periods of human society, leadership plays a central role in maintaining the order of social cooperation. Combined with the findings from research on evolutionary cooperation, it can be concluded that using the punishment mechanism and hierarchy, leaders can help their communities to overcome the ＂free - riding problems＂ Altruistic punishment essentially expressed as the punishment of leaders, cooperation organizations are more generally expressed as cooperation under the leadership. Meanwhile, plentiful evidence from public games in experimental economics support the view that the pattern of leadership - followership can significantly improve the level of cooperation in social dilemma problems.

关 键 词：领导-追随 合作 演化博弈 惩罚 公共物品实验 

分 类 号：F069.9[经济管理—政治经济学]