农村房屋征收中的博弈与冲突  

Games and Conflicts in Rural Housing Expropriation

作　　者：张卫东[1] 谭家强[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《吉首大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第2期48-54,共7页Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12CSH026)

摘　　要：房屋征收引发的冲突是当前中国社会面临的严峻问题。在农村房屋的征收博弈中,地方政府和被征农民都具有理性行动的策略,从而具有各自的行动逻辑。在房屋征收中,既有权力对权利的压制,也有权利对权力的抗争。非市场化的补偿使得农民的"禀赋效应"与政府的"公正补偿"存在价值观的冲突,而强制交易的征收逻辑致使冲突发生、矛盾升级并产生"合作者亏损"的博弈结局。因此,房屋征收制度的改革与调整不仅应朝着市场化的方向迈进,还要建立相应的约束机制对征收博弈中的各方进行必要的规制。Conflicts in housing expropriation is a severe problem in Chinese society.In the games of rural housing expropriation,local governments and the expropriated peasants both have their own behavioral logic as well as the according strategies for rational behaviors.Thus,in the course of housing expropriation,there are suppression and fights from both rights.The non-market-driven compensation causes the values conflict between the peasants＇ ＂endowment effect＂and the government＇s＂fair compensation＂.Afterward,the expropriation logic from coercive transaction makes conflicts happen and intensify,leading to the game of＂collaborators loss＂.Therefore,the system should be adjusted towards market-oriented direction,and appropriate restraint mechanisms should be established in order to regulate the parties in the collection game.

关 键 词：房屋征收 博弈 冲突 法律规制 

分 类 号：F301.3[经济管理—产业经济] D922[政治法律—法学]